Recently, a novel bit-level color image encryption scheme based on improved one-dimension (1D) chaotic map has been proposed. It was claimed that the proposed scheme is secure due to the improved 1D chaotic map with better chaotic performance. Some security analyses and simulation experiments were presented to show that it could resist various attacks. However, we found that there are some security loopholes in the original scheme, and then proposed an effective attack strategy utilizing chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in this paper. The proposed strategy mainly includes two attacks. The first is to obtain the equivalent secret key of the diffusion right shift phase, and the second is to obtain the permutation right shift rule. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed method are verified by both theoretical analyses and experimental results. Some proposals are also given for improving the security of the original encryption scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet and multimedia technology, more and more multimedia data appear in our daily life, and digital image is one of the most popular multimedia data [1] , [2] . However, Internet brings us great convenience as well as some negative effects such as personal privacy disclosure and military secrets leakage [3] , [4] . Therefore, image encryption has received extensive attention and research [5] , [6] . Image encryption, which aims to protect the privacy of images by preventing the unauthorized access, is considered high-efficient and popular means to secure digital images.
Chaotic map can be used to generate a series pseudorandom numbers by self-iteration according to the initial parameters. The chaos-based encryption method is considered very suitable for image encryption because of the inherent features of the chaotic map it uses, such as ergodicity and sensitivity to initial condition and control parameters [7] - [10] . Therefore, many image encryption schemes [11] - [14] based on chaos are widely studied. However, these schemes have been successfully cracked The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Wei Huang .
due to the existence of vulnerabilities by some special attack methods, such as chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext attack [15] - [18] . Cryptanalysis is the very technology which aims to break an existing cryptosystem in order to test the security and make improvement of the original scheme. Zhang's encryption scheme [11] based on three-dimension bit matrix permutation has been broken in [15] . Li et al. [16] cryptanalyzed a symmetric image encryption scheme [12] . In [17] , a new image encryption scheme [13] , which employed additional substitution structure, has also been attacked. Li et al. [18] successfully cryptanalyzed and attacked a color image encryption based on hybrid hyper-chaotic system in [14] . A cryptographic system is considered to be secure only if it can resist various attacks.
The bit-level image encryption schemes have unique advantages when encrypting images, while the abovementioned encryption schemes do not have. No matter the permutation phase or the diffusion phase, bit-level image encryption scheme can bring more randomness than other encryption schemes to make it more difficult to be cracked. Some bit-level image encryption schemes based on chaotic map have been proposed with excellent performance [19] , [20] . A new simple and effective improved 1D chaotic system, which has better chaotic performance than the existing 1D chaotic map, was first proposed by Pak et al. in [21] . Based on the improved 1D chaotic map, a novel bitlevel color image encryption scheme with linear-nonlinearlinear conversion structure was also proposed in [21] . The encryption scheme can be reduced to three phases: permutation, diffusion, and linear transformation. It obviously has better security performances than other above-mentioned encryption schemes because of the larger chaotic range and more uniform output sequence it used. However, we found that the encryption scheme is not sufficiently resistant to CPA because of the only one-round permutation-diffusion structure. This paper introduces an effective attack strategy utilizing CPA which can successfully break the encryption scheme in [21] . Both the theoretical analysis and the simulation experiment have verified the high effectiveness and feasibility of our proposed scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an overview of the original bit-level color image encryption scheme proposed by Pak. The detailed process of the attack strategy we proposed and the stimulation experiment are presented in Section III. The last section concludes this paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF PAK'S ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In Section II A, the new simple and effective improved 1D chaotic system which has better chaotic performance than the existing 1D chaotic maps is described in detail. The novel bit-level color image encryption scheme based on the improved 1D chaotic map is shown in Section II B.
A. THE IMPROVED CHAOTIC SYSTEM
Logistic map and sine map have two common problems which widely exist in 1D chaotic maps. The two problems are that its chaotic range is limited and the data distribution of output chaotic sequences is non-uniform. To overcome these two problems, Pak et al. proposed an improved chaotic system which can be used to construct the improved logistic map and the improved sine map.
1) THE STRUCTURE OF IMPROVED CHAOTIC MAP
The new chaotic map is defined by the following formula.
In the above formula, F(u, x n , k) is a newly made chaotic map, and F chaos is a known 1D chaotic map, such as logistic map and sine map. F chaos (u, x n ) is the function where u of the function F chaos (u, x n ) is replaced with (4 − u), and u is a control parameter with the range of [0, 2) ∪ (2, 4] , because all values of the output sequence become zero and the proposed improved system correspondingly loses its chaotic property when u equals 2.
From the above formula, it can be seen that F(u, x n , k) still has a chaotic property in the expanded range of [0, 2) ∪ (2, 4] lager than the range of the existing 1D chaotic maps; due to the extra 'mod' operation, the output sequence range of chaotic system is guaranteed to be (0, 1); G(k) is an adjustable function controlled by parameter k which can be used to adjust the chaotic property of the improved system.
In the following part, two existing 1D chaotic maps are used by Pak to verify the performance of the proposed chaotic system.
2) THE IMPROVED LOGISTIC MAP
By using formula (1), the improved logistic map can be constructed by the following formula.
where x 0 is the initial value of the sequence and the parameter u ∈ [0, 2) ∪ (2, 4].
3) THE IMPROVED SINE MAP
By using formula (1), the improved sine map can be constructed by the following formula.
B. ENCRYPTION PROCESS
The new bit-level image encryption algorithm proposed by Pak adopts six parameters of (x 0 , u, k, N 0 , kd, rp) as the security keys, and its application in information security by using the above-mentioned improved Logistic map is tested. The diagram of the cryptosystem proposed by Pak is shown in Fig. 1 , which can be divided into five phases: bitplane decomposition, permutation, diffusion, linear transformation, and bitplane combination. The input color image with the size of M × N is first decomposed into 3 images with R, G, and B channels respectively. then, the 3 images are linked to get a grayscale image with the size of M × 3N . Finally, the grayscale image obtained above is converted to a 1D image pixel matrix, which is further converted to a image bit matrix B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b M ×24N }.
2) PERMUTATION PHASE
In this phase, four parameters of (x 0 , u, k, N 0 ) will be used as the security keys to generate chaotic sequence, where x 0 is the initial value of the chaotic system and u, k, and N 0 are the control parameters.
The chaotic sequence X used in the encryption system will be obtained first. Iterate the above-mentioned improved chaotic map (M ×24N +N 0 ) times and abandon the former N 0 elements so as to make a new sequence which has M × 24N elements, where N 0 is a positive integer used as the security key.
The permutation position bit matrix X used in the encryption system will be got later by sorting the chaotic sequence X in ascending order.
In the end, the permuted image bit matrix B will be generated by using the permutation equation (4) between the permutation position bit matrix X and the image bit matrix B.
3) DIFFUSION PHASE
This phase is first to obtain the diffusion matrix D which is generated by the following formula.
where kd is a positive integer used as the security key, and the diffusion matrix D only consists of 0 and 1. Then, the encrypted image bit matrix C will be got by performing the diffusion equation (6) between the diffusion matrix D and the permuted image bit matrix B .
4) LINEAR TRANSFORMATION PHASE
A new encrypted image bit matrix C will be obtained by rotating the above obtained matrix C to the right by the amount of rp, where rp is used as security key and
The new image bit matrix C is obtained by the following formula.
, which is a grayscale image, and then the grayscale image is divided into 3 grayscale images sized M ×N . Finally, the 3 grayscale images obtained above is converted into the R, G, and B color image with the size of M × N .
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
According to Kerchoff's principle [22] , the security of a cryptosystem only relies on the secret keys, regardless of the algorithm framework and complexity of the cryptosystem. That is to say, anyone who wants to break a cryptosystem knows everything except the security key. Therefore, after understanding the algorithm of the cryptosystem, one can easily perform cryptanalysis if there exist some potential loopholes in the original cryptosystem.
Although the original encryption system seems secure due to its large key space, we propose a specific attack method against the original cryptosystem. The proposed attack strategy is shown in Fig. 2 , which includes Attack 1 and Attack 2. Attack 1 is employed to obtain the equivalent secret key K of the original diffusion phase and linear transformation phase so as to restore the cipher image to permutation-only image with right shift. Attack 2 is further used to acquire permutation right shift rule f of the original permutation phase. After Attack 1 and Attack 2, we have obtained both the equivalent secret key K and permutation right shift rule f , which means that we can accurately restore the plaintext image from the encrypted image without using the original secret keys. In other words, the original cryptosystem can been completely broken. In the following, we will discuss the cryptanalysis process in detail. 
A. ATTACK 1: OBTAIN THE EQUIVALENT SECRET KEY
Since bitplane decomposition and combination can be performed without any key, we do not discuss the details of these phases. Then, the original image encryption system mainly has three phases: permutation, diffusion, and linear transformation, which need to be broken.
Because the space of key used in the diffusion and linear transformation phase is very large, it is difficult to simply crack the diffusion and linear transformation phase, even using violent attacks. We regard the diffusion phase and the linear transformation phase as one phase, i.e. the diffusion right shift phase, because the linear transformation phase of the original encryption system is just a simple right rotation. Although the generation process of the original diffusion matrix seems hard to crack because of the use of complex structure and large key space, the diffusion matrix is essentially an unknown sequence. Therefore, as long as we find a corresponding equivalent sequence to replace the diffusion matrix, we can break the diffusion right shift phase of original encryption system successfully.
The equivalent secret key K which is functionally equal to the secret key of the diffusion right shift phase can be easily acquired by CPA. We use the full zero image I 0 as the chosen-plaintext image. The detailed process of obtaining the equivalent secret key K is shown in Fig. 3 . What is more, the cipher image C 0 obtained by encrypting full zero image I 0 is exactly the equivalent key of the original diffusion right shift phase, which will be described in detail below.
Based on the assumption of CPA, an attacker can access the encryption machine to obtain ciphertext corresponding to any plaintext. It is worth mentioning that any known permutation algorithm will be out of action when the full zero image is used as a plaintext image because all pixel values of the full zero image are equal. Therefore, we chose the all zero image as the chosen-plaintext image because of its special utility.
After the original permutation phase, the corresponding permuted image P 0 of the chosen-plaintext image I 0 will be obtained. According to (4), we know that the permutation operation does not change the pixel values of plaintext image but only the pixel positions, so P 0 is equal to I 0 .
For the diffusion right shift phase, although we do not understand the secret key used in the phase, the diffusion right shift algorithm of the original encryption system is public and available. After the original diffusion right shift phase, the corresponding ciphertext image C 0 of the permuted image P 0 will be obtained. However, the diffusion right shift phase of the original encryption system is essentially an exclusive or operation with right shift, which can be represented by the following formula.
Thus, according to (8) , P 0 , and C 0 , we can recover the equivalent secret key K of the original diffusion right shift phase by the following formula. K = bitxor(C 0 , P 0 ) = bitxor(C 0 , I 0 )
In addition to describing the process of obtaining the equivalent secret key K in figure, text and equations, we also provide an algorithm. As shown in Algorithm 1, K can be easily After attacking the diffusion right shift phase of the original encryption system, the encryption result generated by the original cryptosystem can be restored to the permutation-only image. In this section, we will further analyze and attack the permutation phase of the original encryption scheme in order to restore the permutation-only image into the original plaintext image, so as to successfully crack the original encryption scheme. The detailed process of obtaining the permutation right shift rule f is shown in Fig. 4 . We first need n pairs of plain image I 1 ,I 2 , . . . ,I n which are chosen as the n chosen-plaintext images; after being encrypted by the original encryption system, the corresponding n cipher images C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n are obtained; we can acquire the permutation right shift rule f by utilizing the equivalent secret key K of the diffusion right shift phase obtained in the previous section. In the following, we will discuss the process of obtaining the permutation right shift rule f in detail.
Since the key space and the key sensitivity used in the permutation phase of the original encryption system are extremely reliable and effective, it is almost impossible to obtain the key directly from the original permutation phase. However, the mapping matrix (permutation right shift rule f ) equivalent to the key of the original permutation phase can be obtained by some special methods. It is worth mentioning that any existing permutation algorithm only changes the positions of pixels or bits without changing the values of them, which makes it possible for an attacker to successfully crack the permutation process of any permutation algorithm under CPA. If we can determine the new position of each pixel or bit of the plain image after the permutation operation, we can acquire the whole mapping matrix (the permutation right shift rule) which is equivalent to the key of the permutation phase. Thus, the permutation phase of the original cryptosystem can be successfully cracked.
In order to mark the location of each bit of the plain image (because the original encryption scheme is a bit-level color encryption scheme), we construct two mark matrix as shown in Fig. 4 , where M 0 is a mark matrix of the chosen-plaintext image and M 1 is a mark matrix of the permutation-only image. According to Fig. 4 , n pairs of chosen-plaintext images are used and the value of n can be determined by the following formula.
where M ×N denotes the number of pixels of the plain image, i.e. the size of the plain image. Based on the fact that the plain image is an color image which is divided into 3 images with R, G, and B channels respectively, and the original encryption system is a bit-level color encryption scheme, the M × N has to be multiplied by the coefficient of 24.
In the following, we will discuss two practical examples to completely determine the mapping matrix of the permutation operation on the basis of (10) so as to successfully attack the permutation phase of the original encryption system.
Example 1: Suppose the length of the 1D bit matrix converted from a plain image is 8, obviously we only need three special images used as the chosen-plaintext images to uniquely identify each bit of the plain image on the basis of (10). First, three special images shown in Fig. 5 are constructed and used as the chosen-plaintext images. Besides, a decimal mark matrix M 0 used to mark each bit of the three chosen-plaintext images are constructed by saving the value of each bit of the three chosen-plaintext images vertically. As shown in Fig. 5 , each value in the mark matrix M 0 is different and thus uniquely marks each bit of the three chosen-plaintext images.
Then, the three permutation-only images corresponding to the three chosen-plaintext images are obtained by permutation operation with a mapping matrix M = {3, 4, 8, 2, 5, 7, 6, 1} whose values of each bit are arbitrarily chosen.
Next, a decimal mark matrix M 1 ={2,3,7,1,4,6,5,0} with the same structure and size as M 0 is obtained by saving the value of each bit of the three permutation-only images vertically.
In the end, based on the fact shown in Fig. 5 that the value of each bit of matrix M is one more than that of matrix M 1 , we can get the mapping matrix M just by adding one to the value of each bit of matrix M 1 even though we do not know the value of each bit of the mapping matrix M used by the permutation operation.
We can see the relationship between the mark matrix M 1 and the mapping matrix M through Example 1 that the value of each bit of the mark matrix M 1 is one less than the value of each bit of the mapping matrix M. And the relationship between the mark matrix M 1 and the mapping matrix M can be expressed by the following formula.
Based on the above process and (11), the mapping matrix M (permutation right shift rule f ) of the permutation operation can be obtained successfully.
Example 2: Suppose the size of a plain image I is 256×256, the length of the 1D bit matrix converted from the plain image I is 1572864(256 × 256 × 24), which is greater than 2 20 but less than 2 21 , obviously we need twenty-one special images used as the chosen-plaintext images to uniquely identify each bit of the plain image I on the basis of (10).
The process of example 2 is exactly the same as that of example 1, except that the number of the chosen-plaintext images and the length of the mark matrix used in the two examples are different, which is caused by the different size of the plain image.
First, twenty-one special images I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I 21 shown in Fig. 6 are constructed and used as the chosen-plaintext images. Besides, a decimal mark matrix M 0 used to mark each bit of the twenty-one chosen-plaintext images are constructed by saving the value of each bit of the twenty-one chosen-plaintext images vertically. As shown in Fig. 6 , each value in the mark matrix M 0 is different and thus uniquely marks each bit of the twenty-one chosen-plaintext images.
Then, the twenty-one permutation-only images P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 21 corresponding to the twenty-one chosenplaintext images I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I 21 are obtained by invoking the above-mentioned Algorithm 2 twenty-one times.
Next, a decimal mark matrix M 1 with the same structure and size as M 0 is obtained by saving the value of each bit of the twenty-one permutation-only images P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 21 vertically.
In the end, based on (11) obtained from Example 1, we can get the mapping matrix M (permutation right shift rule f ) just by adding one to the value of each bit of matrix M 1 even though we do not know the value of each bit of the mapping matrix M used by the permutation operation.
According to the above process and (11), the mapping matrix M (permutation right shift rule f ) of the permutation operation can be obtained successfully, which can be seen in Algorithm 3. 
C. SUMMARY OF THE ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section, we provide a detailed summary about the overall attack process of recovering the equivalent secret key K and permutation right shift rule f .
Step 1: Obtain the equivalent secret key K of the diffusion right shift phase by invoking Algorithm 1 with the help of the full zero image.
Step 2: Obtain the permutation right shift rule f using the following sub steps.
First, determine the number n of the chosen-plaintext images using (10) and construct the chosen-plaintext images I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n like the one shown in Fig. 6 .
Then, obtain the corresponding permutation-only images P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n of the chosen-plaintext I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n by invoking Algorithm 2 n times.
Finally, obtain the permutation right shift rule f (mapping matrix M) for the permutation-only images.
Step 3: Invoke Algorithm 2 to obtain the permutation-only image of the ciphertext image C.
Step 4: Invoke Algorithm 4 to obtain the deciphered image I of the ciphertext image C.
D. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed attack strategy are verified by the simulation experiment which were performed on a personal computer equipped with an Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-8550U CPU 1.80GHz and 8 GB memory capacity. The software of MATLAB R2016a was used in the simulation experiment.
All kinds of digital color images can be attacked successfully by the proposed attack strategy. Here, we take 'Lina' image with the size of 256 × 256 as an example to carry out the simulation experiment in order to verify the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed attack strategy. The 'Lina' image act as plain image shown in Fig. 7(a) were firstly decomposed by the bitplane decomposition phase of the original encryption system, and the decomposed image is shown in Fig. 7(b) . After the permutation phase, diffusion phase, and linear transformation phase, we can get the encrypted image of the decomposed image shown in Fig. 7(c) , which will be combined to the final cipher image shown in Fig. 7(d) in the bitplane combination phase. Then, we can perform our proposed attack strategy step by step to obtain the equivalent secret key K and the permutation right shift rule f of the original encryption system. With the help of the equivalent secret key K, the final ciphertext image can be restored to permutation-only image shown in Fig. 7(e) . Using the permutation right shift rule f obtained by Algorithm 3, we can successfully get the decrypted image shown in Fig. 7(f) . By observing the result of an exclusive or operation shown in Fig. 7(g) between the decrypted image and the plain image, it can be determined that the decrypted image is completely equivalent to the plain image, which fully confirms the feasibility of the attack strategy we proposed.
E. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The proposed attack strategy mainly includes Attack 1 and Attack 2. Attack 1 needs to use a full zero image to obtain the equivalent key K, thus 1 time of CPA is required to break the diffusion phase of the original encryption system. The permutation phase of the original encryption system can be successfully broken with the help of log 2 (M × 24N ) chosen-plaintext images, hence log 2 (M × 24N ) times of CPA are required in Attack 2. Therefore, the total computational complexity of the attack strategy we proposed is O( log 2 (M × 24N ) + 1).
The average running times of the proposed attacks for different images with different sizes were also tested. Given a plain image sized 256 × 256, the average running times of Attack 1 and Attack 2 are 0.245015s and 3.569557s respectively, and it will cost 3.814572s in average for totally breaking the cryptosystem. When the image size is 512×512, the running time increased reasonable. The average running times of Attack 1 and Attack 2 are 0.957368s and 16.634332s respectively, and it will cost 17.591700s in average for totally breaking the cryptosystem. Clearly, the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy is acceptable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel bit-level color image encryption scheme using improved 1D chaotic map was cryptanalyzed. The original cryptosystem was found to have potential risks that cannot resist CPA attack due to the simple linear-nonlinearlinear structure. We have proposed an attack strategy that can completely break the original encryption system with O( log 2 (M × 24N ) + 1) times of CPA in total. One full zero image is used to obtain the equivalent secret key of the original diffusion right shift phase, and the remaining log 2 (M × 24N ) chosen plaintext images are used to obtain the permutation right shift rule. Simulation experiment has verified the effectiveness and feasibility of the attack strategy we proposed.
Based on the cryptanalysis of this paper, we also proposed three practical proposals to enhance the security of the original encryption system: 1) Dynamic keys that vary with plaintext or time should be used to increase resistibility to various attacks. 2) More efficient diffusion functions should be appended after the original diffusion phase to achieve avalanche effect to some extent. 3) Multiple rounds of encryption should be adopted.
